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SUMMARY
Job creation and economic development have become a
centerpiece of state and local policy.  Each year, billions of
state and local tax dollars are committed to local develop-
ment projects in the U.S., often in the form of providing
inducements to high-profile companies, subsidizing enter-
tainment infrastructure (such as arenas or stadiums), or cre-
ating “cluster” developments.  Though these investments
are increasingly common, their returns are risky, if at all
positive, and their benefits are frequently aimed at a small
segment of the local population.
Early childhood education, in contrast, appears to offer
greater potential returns and substantially less risk, and
should be included by state and local leaders as a component
of their economic development policy toolkit. CED encour-
ages local development policy-makers to view early educa-
tion as a development tool and appreciate its lasting bene-
fits. It is time that early education is implemented with the
same energy, urgency, and funding that is currently being
applied to other, less-promising, development projects.
PUBLIC INVESTMENT IN
DEVELOPMENT
The rise of state and local investment in development
State and local economic development policies have
been around since the beginnings of the Republic, but the
precursors to current local development policies surfaced
during the 1970s when an energy crunch, global competi-
tion, and high unemployment forced state and local govern-
ments to take action to attract economic development and
jobs.1 Since then, added employment pressures and increased
mobility of labor and capital have further expanded “territo-
rially competitive” development policies, and by 1994 states
averaged twenty-four inducement programs per state.2
The scale of state and local “inducement” policies
State and local developmental policies contain vast
amounts of funding for inducement and marketing pack-
ages, including:
• Grants to communities for business loans and loan
guarantees;
• Provision of job training specific to business or indus-
try request;
• Infrastructure provision;
• Tax relief; and
• Site/building provision
Annual city government spending for such economic
development initiatives is usually between $7–$16 per capita,
which is about $2–$4 billion each year, nationwide.
However, tax exemptions probably cost local governments
much more — a study in Michigan estimated that tax relief
to promote development costs about $40 per capita annually.3
Measuring the returns to local “inducement” policies
Estimating the total social returns to development
inducements is an unreliable exercise. The social returns
depend on the definition of benefits, estimates of the life and
details of the projects (which are often subject to change),
and the point of view from which benefits are calculated (for
example, from the local, state, or national perspective).
Many of the benefits are difficult to quantify and benefit defi-
nitions are controversial. Despite these problems, however,
there is substantial evidence that the returns to territorially
competitive investments are minimal, if not negative, espe-
cially if viewed from a wider (state or national) perspective.4
The problems with a territorially competitive approach
to investing in development have been widely documented.*
The current bidding wars put companies and athletic teams
3
*See: Paul C. Cheshire and Ian R. Gordon, “Territorial Competition and
the Logic of Collective (In)action,” International Journal of Urban and
Regional Research, vol. 20, no. 3 (1996); Paul C. Cheshire and Ian R.
Gordon, “Territorial Competition: Some Lessons for Policy,” The Annals
of Regional Science, vol. 32, no. 3 (1998);  Andrés Rodríguez-Pose and
Glauco Arbix, “Strategies of Waste: Bidding Wars in the Brazilian
Automobile Sector,” International Journal of Urban and Regional Research,
vol. 25, no. 1 (2001).
This publication was created by the Committee for Economic
Development (CED) as part of The Pew Charitable Trusts’ initiative to
advance high quality prekindergarten for all of the nation’s three and
four year olds through objective, policy-focused research, state 
public education campaigns, and national outreach. The views
expressed are those of the authors and not necessarily of The 
Pew Charitable Trusts.
Ev Ehrlich, former CED Research Director, and Tracy Kornblatt, a 
former CED Research Associate, prepared the text. As a “Working
Paper,” this publication is intended as an interim report which sum-
marizes current research on the economic benefits of early educa-
tion. As such, it will set the stage for the next CED policy statement
on early childhood education planned for 2006.
The authors would like to make special note of the contributions of
Arthur Rolnick, who not only co-authored a seminal paper on early
childhood development as an economic development tool (with 
Rob Grunewald, accessible at http://minneapolisfed.org/research/
studies/earlychild/earlychild.pdf), but has worked to call business
leaders’ attention to these results in Minnesota and elsewhere.
                      
in a powerful position, able to comparison shop for the best
package of tax relief and inducements, often accepting bene-
fits packages for a short-term commitment, and then able to
(threaten to) relocate, accepting more inducements after the
original incentives run out.  The cost of inducements drives
the net social benefits from “winning” corporate investment
down to a minimum, if they are positive at all.  Any benefit
derived from the relocation of jobs is experienced at the
local level.  On a larger scale, the U.S., for example, derives
no social benefit when jobs move from Missouri to
Mississippi,† and any tax dollars spent to fund such a move
result in a net loss of social welfare.  
Not only are benefits of territorially competitive policy
minimized and localized, but also they are often unrealized,
as compared to predictions at the start of the investment.
Though development incentives are made in anticipation of
gains in the form of direct jobs, secondary jobs, and future
growth in tax revenue, many of these benefits are predicted
using assumptions about the time horizon and size of the
investment to which the firm will commit over time, and
firms often do not meet their commitments (i.e., a sports
team demands a new stadium after twenty years instead of
thirty, a firm employs only half the number of employees it
originally promised).  Sometimes firms fail to meet commit-
ments not because of poor intent.  Instead, the incentives
themselves may distort the location process so much that
the firm chooses a location that is not economically viable
long-term.  Furthermore, an unpredictable number of jobs
created go to in-migrants, and, depending on the capacities
of existing schools and other public infrastructure, there
may be additional public costs to job creation and resultant
growth. 
The idea that pursuing such zero-sum gain policy is not
in the nation’s best interests underlies Melvin L. Burstein
and Arthur J. Rolnick’s demand that Congress outlaw terri-
torially competitive policy.5 Though quantification of bene-
fits from development inducement is unclear, it is clear that
analysts question the returns to such policy, and find ample
reason to believe that the returns are low, if positive.
Examining three popular categories of public investment in
more detail provides a better picture of the questions sur-
rounding social benefits of development policy.
Clusters/Industrial Parks Since Michael
Porter’s seminal work on clusters, many localities have
turned to clusters or industrial parks as a source of self-sus-
taining economic development.6 Defining a cluster is chal-
lenging (academics admit the vagueness and breadth of the
term), but the general idea is that a network of firms inter-
acts and becomes interdependent, creating linkages and col-
lective assets that tie firms to the cluster location, and
attract similar firms requiring similar inputs, specialized
services, labor, etc.7 Clusters have garnered much attention
because they can seemingly transform a lagging region into
a thriving, self-sustaining one.8 This prospect has caused
local policymakers to attempt to create clusters, by induce-
ments and other policies. But there are few, if any, examples
of policy-led clusters achieving success.9 The true precondi-
tions for successful clusters seem to be more deeply-rooted
characteristics of the region, such as education level of the
population, access to educational and other resources,
access to required inputs/outputs, and existing culture of
trust/cooperation between business leaders.10 Inducements
such as tax cuts and subsidies do not seem to yield the
desired, self-sustaining economic development.
Often, though not necessarily, cluster developments
contain firms in similar industries — such as Silicon Valley
or the Route 29 Technology Corridor in Eastern
Massachusetts — and high-tech science parks have gar-
nered the most attention. In 1998, an estimated 135 science
parks were located around the U.S., and most received pub-
lic subsidization.11
Scott Wallsten found no significant positive effect of
science parks on regional development, measured in terms
of jobs, number of firms, and invested venture capital.12
Though many communities attempt to replicate the success
of Stanford Research Park in Silicon Valley, Silicon Valley’s
success is a rarity in the field, and it was not initiated by
public (or private) design. Silicon Valley’s success appears
more the result of the intense nature of competition in the
region than public subsidization. The majority are parks
such as the Texas Research Park in San Antonio, which
broke ground in the mid-1980s, with predictions of 50,000
jobs in thirty years. As of 2004, the park has created 300
jobs. A research park that began in the 1980s in Prince
George’s County, Maryland, has been deemed a failure, and
the state is seeking a refund on some of the millions it
poured into the infrastructure.13 In sum, policies designed to
create science parks or clusters are unlikely to be successful
or have positive returns to investment.
Professional Sports Investments Public
investment in sports teams, namely building/renovating are-
nas and stadiums has grown rapidly over the last fifteen
years.  Between 1990-1998, forty-six major league stadi-
ums/arenas were built, and between 1998–1999 an addition-
al forty-nine facilities were under construction or in active
planning.14 The cost of these facilities averaged $21.7 bil-
lion, roughly two-thirds of which was funded publicly.
Though studies funded by the teams or local chambers of
commerce assert net benefits to the community from team
investment, the calculations are often based on unrealistic
assumptions about local value added.15 Benefits that are
derived from the new stadium go largely to the team’s man-
agement and players, and, though such benefits would still
be counted as social benefits (total benefits to anyone in
the society), they bring up distributional concerns and
promise large-scale out-of-town leakage of benefits (rather
than the assumed in-town spending and multiplier effects).
Additionally, any benefits are based on assumptions about
how long the team stays in its new facility, how big of a
public draw the team will be (which can be based somewhat
on performance), the entertainment choices of consumers
in the absence of new stadia, and other factors that are sub-
Committee for Economic Development
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ject to change.  John Siegfried and Andrew Zimbalist con-
clude, “…independent work on the economic impact of sta-
diums and arenas has uniformly found that there is no sta-
tistically significant positive correlation between sports
facility construction and economic development.”16
Incentives to High-Profile Companies
Table 1 shows a sample of the inducement packages that
have been offered to high-profile companies.  The size of
these subsidies is quite large, and, even if the location that
“wins” the company or firm receives net social benefits, the
likelihood of net social benefits on a larger scale (which
would only occur if the incentives prevented a socially-ben-
eficial company from locating outside the U.S., or from
choosing an inefficient U.S. location) are quite small.
There are an estimated 1,500 major corporate expansions or
relocations in the U.S. per year and an estimated 15,000
economic development organizations courting them —
which places businesses in a good position for capturing
benefits.17 In fact, there is a popular view that inducements
to large-scale plants reduce the welfare of local residents (a
winners’ curse of sorts), but Michael Greenstone and Enrico
Moretti have found evidence to the contrary, explaining
why local interests in subsidization schemes remains high.18
But while there may be incentives at the local level to
subsidize million-dollar plants, from the larger perspective
the benefits erode, as the plant likely would have located
somewhere in the
U.S. (or maybe
even the same
state), even without
subsidization, and
would have con-
tributed (more) to
the tax base and
funded its own
implementation.
There is also the
risk that induce-
ments create losses
by distorting the
firm’s location deci-
sion, causing it to
choose a strategical-
ly weak location. In
such instances, firms
derive benefit from
subsidization, rather
than economic effi-
ciency, and are
forced to relocate
when the subsidy
runs out.
Furthermore,
inducements may
stratify large-scale
industries that oth-
erwise may naturally
cluster and form a global competitive advantage. Take, for
example, the automobile industry. After subsidizing a major
plant to the tune of $250 million or so, a state finds itself
unable to bid for another auto plant, so the major auto
manufacturers end up scattered over several states
(Tennessee, Alabama, South Carolina), rather than clus-
tered together where they may share transport hubs, input
manufacturers, and technological knowledge transfers.  If
U.S. manufacturers lack these competitive assets, unsubsi-
dized, naturally-clustered sites in other countries may be
more efficient and competitive, by comparison.‡ On a feder-
al level, the loss incurred by companies operating at other-
wise undesirable locations is a serious concern in the long
run. Undistorted, market-based location decisions are a bet-
ter path to U.S. economic growth.
Table 1 gives an idea of the subsidization of large-scale
projects — not all jobs created are subsidized to this degree.
For example, Timothy Bartik estimates that a new job creat-
ed should cost about $7,000/year in public subsidization or
tax revenue forgone.19 The problem is that these numbers
do not indicate net social benefits.  For example, it cannot
be known if a $7,000 subsidy per new job created is a good
deal for local residents or not — the benefits and spillover
benefits are highly individualized by project, difficult to
quantify, and depend on the life of the company, which can
be subject to drastic change.20
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Table 1: Local Subsidization of Sample Corporations
Company Receiving 
Subsidy Location Year Subsidization Comments
Micron Technology Lehi, UT 1995 $80 million
Mercedes Benz Alabama 1993 $250-$300 million Estimated subsidization of $170,000/job
Blue Water Fibre Michigan 1994 $80 million With 34 employees, subsidization per job ª 
$2.4 million 
Volkswagen Pennsylvania 1978 $70 million Factory promised 20,000 jobs, but only 
employed 6,000 and closed after a decade
Northwest Airlines Minnesota 1992 $700 million Northwest promised 2,000 jobs at 2 facilities,
but later scaled back to 1 facility and 1,000 
jobs. Subsidization per job ª $558,000.
Toyota Georgetown, KY Late 1980s $200 million Subsidization per job ª $80,000
Boeing Chicago, IL 2001 $50 million Subsidization per job ª $100,000
BMW Greenville/ 1992 $115 million Predicted jobs created: 2,000 direct,
Spartanburg, SC 2,000 indirect
United Airlines Indianapolis, IN 1992 $320 million United promised to invest $500 million, but only
put in $229 million, and closed the facility in 
2003. The city currently owns the facility and 
tools, and pays $34 million/year to retire the 
bond issue and $6 million/year to maintain the 
empty facility
Nissan Tennessee 1980 Subsidization per job ª $11,000 
Sources: Chris Farrell, “The Economic War Among the States: An Overview,” The Region, Federal Reserve Bank of
Minneapolis, June 1996; Michael Greenstone and Enrico Moretti, Bidding for Industrial Plants: Does Winning a ‘Million
Dollar Plant’ Increase Welfare? Working Paper No. 9844 (Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research,
July 2003); Louis Uchitelle, “States Pay for Jobs, but It Doesn’t Always Pay Off,” The New York Times, November 10,
2003; Mitch Emmons, “AU Researchers Question State’s Industry-Luring Concessions” Auburn University News,
October 27, 1995, Available at < http://www.auburn.edu/administration/univrel/news/archive/10_95news/
10_95concessions.html> Accessed on June 16, 2004. 
                   
Though the precise effects of development investments
cannot be accurately quantified, we can tell that competi-
tive bidding and subsidization minimizes the net social ben-
efits of development investments, creates potentially harm-
ful market distortion, and makes the investments high risk.
We can further conclude that there is active interest in
public investment in economic development, even if it is at
a high cost and with low expected net benefits. CED rec-
ommends channeling this interest and public funding into
projects that promise even greater returns — namely early
childhood education.  
EARLY EDUCATION AS A
DEVELOPMENT TOOL
October 2000 U.S. Census data reveal that only 52
percent of all children ages three to five (not yet enrolled
in kindergarten) were enrolled in “nursery school.”§ 21
Additionally, enrollment was substantially less frequent in
low-income households, and children of low-income fami-
lies were overwhelmingly (89 percent) enrolled in public
programs like Head Start, while 77 percent of children
from families with incomes of $75,000 or more attended
private schools. These data support concerns regarding
overall low attendance rates and inequity of services being
provided to America’s children. Unlike several Western
European countries, many children in the U.S. do not have
access to preschool programs, and the quality of current
offerings, especially for children of low-income families, is
questionable.  CED first raised these concerns in Preschool
for All: Investing in a Productive and Just Society.
Low pre-kindergarten enrollment rates and unequal
access to pre-kindergarten are a concern because experi-
mental, high-quality, intensive preschool programming,
when tested under accepted experimental conditions, can
be shown to produce substantial net social benefits.22 Two
such experiments, the High Scope/Perry Preschool project
and the Carolina Abecedarian project, are estimated to
have produced benefits in the range of $2–$8 per dollar
invested. 
High/Scope Perry Preschool Project The
Perry program served children of low-income families in
Ypsilanti, Michigan from 1962 to 1967, and participants
received extraordinary preschool offerings. Most partici-
pants received two years of services, which included a 2.5
hour/day, nine-months/year classroom component, as well
as a ninety-minute teacher home visit once per week.
Additionally, student/teacher ratios were unusually low, and
teachers were more qualified than most, being both certified
public teachers and trained in child development. The
experiment contained a total of 123 children. Participants
and members of the experimental control group have been
followed extensively, providing a comprehensive look into
the broad range of costs and benefits associated with the
program. As estimated by Steven Barnett, by the time par-
ticipants reached 27 years of age, the results in Table 2 had
been obtained. The 3 percent discount rate analysis indi-
cates benefits of $8.74 per dollar invested. Assuming a dif-
ferent discount rate, of course, changes the net benefits, but
the net benefits still remain positive. At a 5 percent dis-
count rate, benefits are estimated at $5.58/dollar invested,
and at a 7 percent discount rate, social benefits are predict-
ed to be $3.75/dollar invested.23 Worthy of note is the sub-
stantial portion of benefits attributed to crime reduction.
These benefits are quantified including estimates of costs
both to the judicial system and estimates of losses (financial
and emotional) to victims.
Carolina Abecedarian Early Intervention
The Abecedarian educational child care project, like the
Perry Preschool, was a true experimental project, and
included 111 students in Chapel Hill, North Carolina,
beginning in 1972.  Also like Perry, participants were chil-
dren in low-income and often African-American families.
Those allocated to the treatment group attended a year-
round, full-day center, which provided free transportation
Committee for Economic Development
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Table 2: Perry Preschool
Projected Program Social Benefits/Costs per
Participant
In present value 1992 dollars
Assumed Discount Rate 3% 5% 7%
Measured Effects
Child Care 738 722 702
K-12 Education 6,872 5,575 4,441
Adult Education 283 188 127
College -868 -590 -354
Earnings 14,498 9,354 6,098
Crime 49,044 33,516 23,238
Welfare 219 157 117
Total Measured Effects 70,786 48,922 34,369
Projected Effects
Earnings 15,833 6,394 3,418
Crime 21,337 11,214 6,055
Welfare 46 25 14
Total Projected Effects 37,216 18,173 9,487
Total Measured and Projected 108,002 67,095 43,856
Cost of Preschool Program -12,356 -12,022 -11,705
NET BENEFIT $95,646 $55,073 $32,151
Source: W. Steven Barnett, Lives in the Balance: Age-27 Benefit-
Cost Analysis of the High/Scope Perry Preschool Program, Monographs
of the High/Scope Educational Research Foundation: Number Eleven
(Ypsilanti, MI: The High/Scope Press, 1996).
‡ The losses incurred by subsidizing an auto industry into fragmentation
are well documented in a study of Brazil: Andrés Rodríguez-Pose and
Glauco  Arbix, “Strategies of Waste: Bidding Wars in the Brazilian
Automobile Sector,” International Journal of Urban and Regional Research,
vol. 25, no. 1 (2001).
§ “Nursery school” is defined as “a group or class that is organized to pro-
vide educational experiences for children during the year or years preced-
ing kindergarten.”  This definition includes Head Start programs.
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and included staff at unusually high student/teacher ratios
(3:1 for infants/toddlers; 6:1 for older children).  The most
recent assessment of participants was made at age twenty-
one, and the cost-benefit analysis breaks down as shown in
Table 3.   The Abecedarian program reveals benefits of
$3.78 for each dollar invested, assuming a 3 percent dis-
count rate, and $2.20 and $1.45 in benefit per dollar invest-
ed, assuming a 5 percent and 7 percent discount rate,
respectively.  
The net benefits in both analyses, of course, are subject
to question and interpretation.  Estimation and quantifica-
tion of social benefits, such as less fear of crime, is an impre-
cise exercise.  Some benefits may be overstated, and others
may be excluded, including benefits to siblings and future
generations.** The sample sizes of the programs were small
and the environments unique. The cost-benefit analysis
may not be exact, but the best evidence by professionals
consistently indicates that these programs yield extraordi-
nary benefits, and certainly have more promise of positive
return to investment than professionals estimate for territo-
rially competitive inducements.  
The cost-benefit analyses of Perry and Abecedarian are
a first indicator of a larger discovery about early education
programs: the real benefits are not from making children
smarter, but from nurturing children’s noncognitive skills,
giving them social, emotional, and behavioral benefits that
lead to success later in life.24 Early education programs have
proven to temporarily raise participants’ IQs, but those
effects dissipate early on in elementary school, while affects
on children’s behavior and self-discipline are lasting.25
Evidence indicates that these positive effects are more per-
sistent when a program is preventative, intensive, and starts
at a very early age.26 And, according to Pedro Carneiro and
James J. Heckman, skill begets skill in a dynamic process, so
skills gained early help students gain more skills in the next
stage of development, and missing out on skills early is hard
to compensate for later.27 This theory is supported by Perry
and Abecedarian participants: those receiving the treat-
ment had more positive achievement scores, educational
attainment, employment, and social outcomes (for example
rates of crime and teen pregnancy).
Because of low participation rates and unequal access,
we should be concerned that children, and society, are miss-
ing out on these key benefits of early education. With only
half of children ages 3-5 involved in early education pro-
grams at all, and with many of those programs of insuffi-
cient quality to prepare children for school success,†† we can
assume that many children are being underserved, and that
investing in broader and more intense offerings would yield
positive returns.
Perry or Abecedarian is not the only solution for other
communities, nor would replication guarantee similar
effects when applied in other environments.  The results of
Perry and Abecedarian cannot be generalized to larger and
different program applications.  Unfortunately, the evidence
is limited.  More research is needed to determine optimal
program designs and targeting, and, in particular, there is a
need to evaluate larger samples.28
But we can be certain that early childhood education
offers much more promise of positive net social benefits than
many of the territorially competitive incentive packages in
which state and local governments invest billions each year,
despite their frequent negative returns.  
We understand that, given the current inducement-
based system, it would be political and economic suicide for
a state not to compete for economic development with
incentive packages.29 We cannot expect state and local gov-
ernments to instantly substitute childhood investments for
their current development initiatives. But we can educate
policy-makers about the role of early childhood education
as an economic development tool, with better expected
return, less risk, and less damaging distortion than existing
inducement programs, and demand slow but steady change.
The evidence makes early education an easy sell.  We hope
to see policy-makers funding the further research that is
needed and then appropriately investing in early education
as a developmental priority.
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Table 3: Abecedarian Early
Intervention
Projected Program Social Benefits/
Costs per Participant
In present value 2002 dollars
Assumed Discount Rate 3% 5% 7%
Program Benefits
Participant Earnings 37,531 16,460 6,376
Earnings of Future Generations 5,722 1,586 479
Maternal Earnings 73,608 51,939 38,085
K-12 Education 8,836 7,375 6,205
Smoking/Health 17,781 4,166 1,008
Higher Education Costs -8,128 -5,621 -3,920
AFDC 196 129 85
Total Benefits 135,546 76,034 48,318
Program Cost -35,864 -34,599 -33,421
NET BENEFIT $99,682 $41,435 $14,897
Source: Leonard N. Masse and W. Steven Barnett, A Benefit-Cost
Analysis of the Abecedarian Early Childhood Intervention (New
Brunswick, NJ: National Institute for Early Education Research,
2002).
** In the Perry Preschool analysis, however, Barnett states explicitly that
the assumptions made lend themselves to underestimation rather than
overestimation of benefits.
†† "W. Steven Barnett, Kenneth Robin, Jason Hustedt and Karen
Schulman, The State of Preschool: 2003 State Preschool Yearbook (New
Brunswick, NJ: National Institute for Early Education Research at Rutgers
University, 2003). www.nieer.org
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